AGENDA DOCUMENT #96-4



FEDERAL ELECTION COMMISSION WASHINGTON, D.C. 20463

RECEIVED FEDERAL ELECTION COMMISSION SECRETARIAT

Jan 3 4 00 PM '96

January 3, 1996

MEMORANDUM

AGENDA ITEM

For Meeting of: 10 1996

TO:

The Commissis

THROUGH:

John C. Spring

Staff Dimecto

FROM:

Lawrence M. Moble

General Counsel

N. Bradley Litchfield

Associate feneral Counse

SUBJECT:

Draft AO 1995-43

Attached is a proposed draft of the subject advisory opinion.

We request that this draft be placed on the agenda for January 10, 1996.

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- 3 Stephen M. Sacks
- 4 Arnold & Porter
- 5 555 Twelfth Street, N.W.
- 6 Washington, D.C. 20004-1202

78 Dear Mr. Sacks:

This responds to your letter dated November 20, 1995, for the law firm of Arnold &

DRAFT

10 Porter ("the firm") which requests an advisory opinion concerning application of the

11 Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971, as amended ("the Act"), and Commission

regulations to the firm's proposed refund of legal fees previously received on behalf of

former Senator Bob Packwood.

The factual background of this request is presented in your letter of November 20

and also in three letters from the firm to the Senate Select Committee on Ethics ("the ethics

committee"); these letters bear the 1994 dates of October 24, November 10 and December

16. In addition, the request includes a letter to the firm from the ethics committee dated

18 June 9, 1995.

According to the request, the firm served as legal counsel to Senator Packwood in

connection with the ethics committee's inquiry into certain activities relating to Mr.

Packwood's service in the Senate. The firm ended its representation of Mr. Packwood in

early December 1993, but continued to provide legal services to him on a pro bono basis

until May 19, 1994. The pro bono services were provided to assist in Mr. Packwood's

transition to other legal counsel.

During the period of its representation, the firm received approximately \$800,000

from Mr. Packwood's Legal Expense Trust Fund ("the trust fund") and the Re-Elect

Packwood Committee ("the Committee"). About 75% of this amount was paid directly

with funds from the Committee and the balance was paid in funds from the trust fund. The

year end report filed by the Committee for 1993 indicates that it paid the amount of

\$600,000 to the firm on November 18, 1993.

1 The firm sought guidance from the ethics committee with respect to reach the sought \$200,000 to the trust fund. The committee advised that the fee adjustment refundance in 2 3 the trust should only be the pro rata amount of \$50,000 (25% of \$200,000). You seek the Commission's advice as to whether the firm's proposed pro rata refund of \$150,000 to the 5 Committee would be a contribution under the Act. The reasons for the firm's fee settlement with Mr. Packwood when it terminated its 6 representation of him are described in the request. The most extensive explanation is 7 contained in the firm's letter dated December 16, 1994, and states the following. 8 When the firm withdrew as counsel to Mr. Packwood in December 1993, he was 9 required to retain new counsel because the ethics committee matter remained active. Prior 10 to the withdrawal, the firm had sent bills to the Senator reflecting the work it had 11 performed. When the firm withdrew, it recognized that its billings calculated solely on the 12 basis of hourly rates did not accurately reflect the fair market value of the services that it 13 14 had performed for Senator Packwood. The value of the work that the firm had performed to that date depended to an 15 appreciable extent on the continued provision of services by the firm, so that 16 investment the firm had made in familiarizing its lawyers with the facts and issue the control of the control o 17 case and in developing its expertise and knowledge would be available to the Senator 18 throughout the proceeding. Once the firm withdrew, the value of that expertise and 19 knowledge was no longer available to the Senator, and the Senator was required to the 20 successor counsel to replicate it. 21 The firm then made its best estimate (\$200,000 0 of what it would cost 22 23 Packwood to replicate with new counsel the expertise and knowledge the firm had developed at his expense which was no longer available to him. At the same time as the 24 withdrawal, the firm made a commitment to Senator Packwood to adjust its fees (a till a 25 amount of \$200,000) for prior services, provided it could do so in a lawful main. 26

The firm has further stated that the proposed adjustment was not a gift by the firm to Senator Packwood, nor was it a voluntary or requested "forgiveness" of fees or a different form of providing <u>pro bono</u> services to the Senator. Quite the contrary, it was a reflection of a loss to the Senator of a portion of the value of the services the firm had performed, occasioned by the change in circumstances, and was intended to assure that Mr. Packwood was not charged <u>more</u> than fair market value for those services. The process the firm went through in proposing the adjustment was not unique to Senator Packwood. It is a process the firm has gone through and would go through in comparable situations for any of its clients.

The firm emphasized to the ethics committee that the hourly billing rates upon which most law firm statements are based are only the stating point for spacesing the fair.

which most law firm statements are based are only the starting point for assessing the fair market value of legal services. Statements submitted by law firms to clients are frequently adjusted after they are rendered, and sometimes even after they are paid. This is not because the firms wish to make a gift to their clients or are settling overcharge claims. Such adjustment are made to conform billings to the fair market value of the legal services actually rendered.

The firm also cited the example when withdrawal from a matter is required due to a conflict of interest that develops during the course of the matter. According to the firm's explanation, it is common in a conflict situation to recognize, in light of the changed circumstances, that the fair market value of its services were less than the amount calculated on the basis of hourly rates alone, since the client did not receive the benefit of the firm's continuing expertise and knowledge and was confronted with a need to incur duplicative expense. Fee adjustments in such circumstances do no more than assure that the client is not overcharged.

In summary, and as it advised the ethics committee, the firm believes the \$200,000 refund payment, to which the firm committed itself, is completely in keeping with ethics

committee rules authorizing legal services to be received by Senators, provided Senators are charged fair market value for those services.

For similar reasons and subject to the discussion below, the Commission concludes that the proposed refund payment by the firm to the Committee is not a contribution under the Act and Commission regulations.

The Act and Commission regulations provide that the terms contribution and expenditure include, inter alia, gifts or payments made by any person for the purpose of influencing any election for to Federal office. 2 U.S.C. §§431(8)(A)(i), 431(9)(A)(i); 11 CFR 100.7(a)(1), 100.8(a)(1). The facts and circumstances of a given gift or payment to a political committee are relevant, if not dispositive, as to the question of the purpose underlying such a transaction. The foregoing circumstances clearly indicate that the purpose of the firm's refund is not to influence any election for Federal office. Instead, the purpose is to implement an adjustment with respect to billings previously issued (and thereafter paid) for the firm's legal services to Senator Packwood where the originally contemplated scope of the firm's engagement by him was materially altered upon its withdrawal as his counsel.

The Commission views such circumstances as somewhat similar to those where a vendor of campaign services to a political committee receives payment in expectation of future events that later are modified from the original agreement or terminated, or that become a matter of dispute between the committee and the vendor. See Advisory Opinion 1987-3 [radio network's refund payment for broadcast services not provided to presidential campaign was permitted, although payable to U.S. Treasury because campaign accepted Federal matching funds and had repayment obligations under 26 U.S.C. §9038]. See also Advisory Opinion 1986-1 [theater corporation allowed to provide valuable tickets to campaign committee as settlement of committee's potential claim for corporation's cancellation of use of its facilities by committee].

1	The Commission emphasizes that this advisory opinion only addresses the specific
2	factual circumstances and narrow legal issue presented; that is, the firm's proposed refund
3	of amounts previously paid by the Committee for legal representation of former Senator
4	Packwood in a matter before the Senate ethics committee. The opinion does not address
5	any questions or imply any Commission views as to whether the Committee's initial
6	disbursement of campaign funds for the firm's legal representation of Senator Packwood
7	was lawful under 2 U.S.C. §439a and Commission regulations at 11 CFR Part 113. The
8	cited provisions state, in part, that no campaign funds of any candidate for Federal office
9	"may be converted by any person to any personal use, other than to defray any ordinary
10	and necessary expenses incurred in connection with his or her duties as a holder of Federal
11	office." 2 U.S.C. §439a, 11 CFR 113.1(g) and 113.2(a).
12	This response constitutes an advisory opinion concerning application of the Act, or
13	regulations prescribed by the Commission, to the specific transaction or activity set forth in
14	your request. See 2 U.S.C. §437f.
15	Sincerely,
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17	Lee Ann Elliott Chairman
18 19	Chanthan
20	Enclosures (AOs 1987-3 and 1986-1)
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